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From the September to June 1976-1977 term to the September session
of the 1977-1978 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reviewed twenty-nine cases which elicited the resolution of eviden-
tiary issues. The means of resolution varied from express reference to the
Federal Rules of Evidence' to the application of statutes and well-settled
case law. This article will review those decisions with a view towards
discerning the types of cases in which evidentiary questions have arisen
most frequently, the courts' analyses of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
the incidence of uniformity in the application and interpretation of various
evidentiary rules.
I
EXPRESS RELIANCE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The issues expressly governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and
resolved by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from
October, 1976, to the date of this writing2 included the relevancy of
character evidence, prior testimony, scope of cross-examination, rehabilita-
tion evidence, admissibility of other crimes and acts, statements made by
co-conspirators, prior theft convictions, expert and lay opinions, admissibil-
ity of business records, privileges and necessity for objections-a funda-
mental evidentiary area.
In some instances the court of appeals thoroughly analyzed the district
courts' evidentiary rulings; however, in others the appellate decisions re-
flected acknowledgment of the broad discretionary powers vested in the
district courts. Similarly, in some instances, the court of appeals' affirm-
ances reflected agreement with the interpretation and application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In other, the affirmances reflected agreement
with the results reached by the district courts but indicated a total variance
with the evidentiary basis for those results. It is the purpose of this section to
review these court of appeals decisions, to analyze the application and
* Philip H. Corboy & Associates; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., Loyola University
School of Law (Chicago).
1. FED. R. EVID. 101-1103 [hereinafter referred to in the text as the Federal Rules or the
rules].
2. November 1, 1977.
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interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and to attempt to discern the
impact these rules have had on the courts applying them.
A. Reversal of the District Court
1. Use of Character Evidence under Rule 404 in Light of the Rules
on Relevancy-401, 402, 403
The defendant in United States v. Staggs3 was wanted by the Marine
Corps for desertion. Two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
4
were sent to Stagg's home in southern Illinois to arrest him. Upon learning
that the FBI had arrived, Staggs went into his bedroom and picked up a gun.
At trial,5 one of the FBI agents testified that Staggs had pointed the gun at
him and had threatened to shoot him if he entered the room. Staggs testified
that he had neither pointed the gun at the agent nor threatened him but that
he had picked up the gun in order to injure himself. The district court
excluded the expert testimony of the defendant's psychologist offered to
establish that the defendant was more likely to harm himself than to direct
his aggressions toward others. The defendant was subsequently convicted of
assault of a federal officer with a deadly weapon.
6
In reversing the district court decision, the court of appeals quoted rule
404(a)(1)7 which permits the accused to introduce evidence of a pertinent
trait of his character for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion. 8 Finding that "a character trait can only
be 'pertinent' if its existence is relevant to the outcome of the case," 9 Judge
Swygert recognized that an essential element of the government's proof was
that the defendant acted with the specific intent to put the officer in
apprehension of bodily harm. Citing rules 401,10 and 402," he concluded
that the psychologist's testimony made more probable the truth of the
3. 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. Hereinafter referred to in the text as FBI.
5. See 553 F.2d at 1074 for a discussion of the district court decision.
6. 18 U.S.C. § Ill (1970).
7. FED. R. EvID. 404 (a)(l). Rule 404(a)(1) states that:
Evidence of a person's character or trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except: (I) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; ....
8. Id.
9. 553 F.2d at 1075.
10. In defining "relevant evidence, rule 401 states: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED.
R. EVID. 401.
II. Rule 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
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defendant's assertion that he harbored no criminal intent during his encoun-
ter with the officer, and that his testimony was relevant to the determination
of whether the defendant had violated the statute. Judge Swygert further
noted that if the Government's case necessitated only proof of general
intent, the testimony was corroborative of the defendant's testimony and,
therefore, was relevant to support the defendant's credibility. 12
Judge Swygert implied that the district court had not ruled on the
relevancy of the evidence but rather had used a relevancy argument to avoid
excluding the evidence on the ground that the defendant had failed to give
the government written notification of his intention to introduce expert
testimony. He reasoned that the district court did not choose to impose this
notice requirement inasmuch as that ruling would have necessitated a
continuance to allow the government to obtain an expert which in turn
would have violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial. 13 Thus, the court
of appeals' reversal did not necessarily reflect an attitudinal difference from
that of the trial court on the admissibility of character evidence under rules
404, 401 and 402.
Similarly, the court of appeals' reversal of the district court in United
States v. Meeker 4 did not reflect any variance with the lower court on the
admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. In Meeker, the defendant
was charged with failing to report income on his 1970 tax returns. To
establish its case at trial,' 5 the government propounded four objectionable
questions to various witnesses. Among these was a question to the defend-
ant's accountant concerning an audit of the defendant in 1966. Rule 404(b)
excludes evidence of other crimes or acts unless offered to prove "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident.' 6 Noting that the government had propounded the
question "to help explain the background for a figure on Meeker's 1970
individual tax returns," 17 Judge Bauer found not only that the question was
unnecessary to establish the figure but also that the implication of prior
misconduct was an "inexcusable distortion of the facts ' 18 and highly
prejudicial, i.e. a reversible error under rule 403.19
12. 553 F.2d at 1075-76.
13. Id. at 1077.
14. 558 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1977).
15. See id. at 388 for a discussion of the district court opinion.
16. Rule 404(b) states that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in confirmity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for the other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
17. 558 F.2d at 389.
18. Id.
19. Rule 403 states that: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
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However, the district court had previously sustained the objection to
this question as well as objections to other questions which the court of
appeals found to be leading, based on inadmissible opinion and hearsay
evidence, and irrelevant. 2° Furthermore, the district court had admonished
the jury to disregard the questions. However, the district court had not found
the defendant's motion for a mistrial meritorious. 21 Thus, the issue for the
court of appeals was not the propriety of the district court's exclusion of the
evidence. Rather, the issue was whether the cumulative effect of this line of
questioning was so prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial. 22 In
answering affirmatively, the court of appeals expressed only its disapproval
of the district court's assessment of the prejudicial questioning. Both courts
agreed that the evidence was inadmissible under rule 404(b).
2. Federal Rule 803(6)-The Business Records Exception
to the Hearsay Rule
In contrast to the relevancy-related cases discussed above, 23 in Stone v.
Morris,24 there was a genuine evidentiary ruling conflict between the
courts. Stone, a state prisoner, brought a civil rights action against prison
officials alleging that the defendants had brutally beaten him. To support his
claim at trial,25 the plaintiff attempted to introduce as a business record in
the form of a memorandum written by prison officials to the staff psychia-
trist which contained damaging statements contradictory to the testimony of
the defendants.
The defendants' argument that the memo was not admissible as a
business record focused on the criteria of Federal Rule 803(6).26 First, they
argued that the memo was not prepared in the regular course of prison
business. Secondly, they argued that the memo lacked the requisite degree
of trustworthiness in that: (1) the memo failed to reveal either the source of
the information, or that its maker had a duty to be accurate; (2) there was no
evidence showing that the counselors routinely prepared such memos; and
(3) there was no evidence that the administrators routinely relied on them.
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
20. 558 F.2d at 388-90.
21. See id. at 388 n.1 for a discussion of the district court decision.
22. Id. at 388.
23. See text accompanying notes 1-22 supra.
24. 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976).
25. See id. at 737-38 for a discussion of the district court opinion.
26. Rule 803(b), an exception to the hearsay rule regarding the admissibility of records of
regularly conducted activity, specifically states:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
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The district court sided with the defendants' arguments and excluded
the evidence as hearsay .27 However, the court of appeals disagreed. In
reversing the district court, the court of appeals held that: (1) a prison is a
business within the contemplation of rule 803(6); (2) the parties had
stipulated to the accuracy of the memo; (3) the document had been made by
a staff member; (4) the paper had been retained in the files of the plaintiff;
(5) the memo was written in the regular course of the prison's business
activity; (6) it most probably was relied upon by prison officials; and (7) the
lack of circumstances of the making of the writing would affect only its
weight and not its admissibility.2 8 Having fulfilled the criteria of 803(b), the
memo was held admissible as a business record.
B. Affirmance of the District Court
1. Rule 404(b): Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts
Rule 404(b) provides that: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may however be admissible for other
purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 29 When rule
404(b) evidence is used for such other purposes, it is further subject to the
requirements that it be relevant3" and not unduly prejudicial, misleading,
confusing or cumulative. 31 The Seventh Circuit reviewed several decisions
in which the district court's interpretation of various aspects of this rule was
contested. In some opinions, the court of appeals' thorough review of the
records and its affirmances of the district courts' rulings suggest a true
uniformity of opinion among the judges. However, in other decisions it is
unclear whether the court of appeals' affirmances denote agreement or
simply deferrence to the trial courts discretion.
In United States v. Krohn,31 the defendants were convicted for the
unlawful interstate transportation of forged checks. 3 3 The trial court ad-
mitted testimony that the defendants had engaged in a series of transactions
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, pro-
fession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
27. See 546 F.2d at 738 for a discussion of the district court opinion.
28. Id. at 738-39.
29. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added).
30. FED. R. EVID. 401. See quoted material in note 10 supra.
31. FED. R. EviD. 403..See quoted material in note 19 supra.
32. 560 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1970).
452
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similar to the one charged. 34 The defendants objections were two-fold: (1)
that opening a back account was not a criminal act; and (2) that the extended
lapse of time, between the acts admitted to show a common scheme and the
acts charged in the indictment had reduced the probativeness to such a point
that it was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Citing rule 404(b), the court of appeals emphasized that "acts" may
be admissible for the limited other purposes enumerated in the rule. 35 As to
the defendants' second objection, Judge Pell concluded: "Once it is recog-
nized that the Danville evidence did tend to show a common scheme or plan,
the insubstantiality of appellants' objection to it is manifest, for broad
discretion is properly accorded a district court in its determination whether
probative value is outweighed by prejudice." 36 It seemed almost as an
afterthought that Judge Pell noted that although a two and one-half month
interval in other instances may have the effect the defendants contended, the
same intervening period in relation to an eight month scheme would not
substantially diminish the probative value of the evidence.
37
Similar contentions were made in United States v. Juarez38 in which
the district court admitted evidene of a narcotics transaction occuring three
months prior to the transaction forming the basis of the government's
charge. 39 The defendant unsuccessfully contended that the charge for the
prior offense had been dismissed prior to trial and, therefore, was not
admissible under rule 404(b). As in Krohn, the court of appeals summarily
dismissed this contention by citing rule 404(b). However, the court of
appeals proceeded to extensively recount the trial court's inquiries, observa-
tion, rulings and instructions concluding that the district court had properly
admitted the evidence as having a tendency to prove intent or state of mind
of the defendantA° Insofar as both transactions involved the same govern-
ment agents testifying, the court of appeals added that the testimony was
also admissible to prove identity. The court also implied that this type of
evidence was admissible to prove a pre-existing design, system, plan or
scheme directed forward to the doing of that act.4 '
The court of appeals' expansion of the purposes for which the evidence
was offered was necessary due to the fact that the evidence arguably offered
34. See 560 F.2d at 2% for a discussion of the district court decision.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 296-97.
38. 561 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. See id. at 70 for a discussion of the district court decision.
40. Id. at 70-74.
41. Id. at 74.
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to show intent was admitted in the government's case-in-chief prior to proof
that the defendant had done the act. Although the defendant did not object to
the order of proof, the court of appeals justified the district court's ruling on
several grounds. First, the statute expressly included the requirement that
the distribution of heroin be done knowingly and intentionally42 from which
the court inferred that the indictment included a similar charge. Secondly,
the defendant did in fact subsequently deny doing the act, thus placing intent
in issue. Finally, the court of appeals noted that although the final instruc-
tion was limited to proof of intent, at the time the testimony came in the
instruction had included all of the purposes cited in rule 404(b).43
As in Krohn," Judge Pell affirmed the district court's assessment of
the prejudicial effect and the probative value of the testimony in accorance
with rule 40345 by stating: "This weighing process is primarily for the
district court to perform; trial judges are much closer to the pulse of a trial
than we can ever be, and 'broad discretion' is necessarily accorded them in
balancing probative value against prejudice." 46
In United States v. Cyphers47 the court of appeals was asked to decide
whether testimony that a defendant had asked a government informer to
purchase narcotics from him shortly after the armed robbery for which he
was on trial had been properly admitted. The defendant contended that the
evidence was inadmissible under the standards set out in the prior Seventh
Circuit case, United States v. Ostrovsky,48 which required that evidence of
other crimes fit within an exception recognized by rule 404(b), possess a
greater degree of probativeness than prejudiciality, and be clear and
convincing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court, noting that the
testimony tended to prove motive and consequently fell within rule 404(b),
and that any prejudice had been dissipated by the fact that the defendant's
use of drugs had been previously brought out by both sides without objec-
tion. Although unnecessary for compliance with the Federal Rules, Judge
Bauer reviewed the record with a view towards the credibility of the witness
who had supplied the questioned testimony and concluded that, insofar as
the trial court and jury had believed him, his testimony was therefore clear
and convincing.
4 9
42. Id. at 72-73.
43. Id. at 74.
44. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
45. See quoted material in note 19 supra.
46. 561 F.2d at 71.
47. 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
48. 501 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1974).
49. 553 F.2d at 1069-70.
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2. Consideration of the Relevancy of Otherwise Admissible Evidence
The question of relevancy is pertinent to the resolution of any eviden-
tiary issue, but it is often coupled with other questions as to the admissibility
of the evidence. The Seventh Circuit recently reviewed two cases in which
the relevancy of the evidence was the focal point of the court's decision and
in which-although the court's affirmance seemingly reflected agreement-
the opinions expressed disapproval of the district courts' analyses of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
The evidentiary problem addressed by the court of appeals in United
States v. Juarez5° involved the propriety of admitting reports pertaining to
the narcotics transaction in which the defendant was allegedly involved
which had been prepared by the testifying government agents. These reports
had been the subject of the cross-examination of the government agents who
had admitted that the reports contained generalizations and inaccuracies.
The reports were offered to rehabilitate these witnesses and were admitted
by the district court on the basis of rules 106, and 801(d)(1)(B). 5'
Rule 106 provides that: "When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. "52
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) reads as follows:
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if-
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is . . .(B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against him of recent fabrica-
tion or improper influence or motive. .... 53
The court of appeals' basis for affirmance was that these reports were
clearly relevant under rule 402.54 The court went on to hold that they were
not excluded by the hearsay rule because they were offered only to affect
credibility.5 5 They were also held not unduly prejudicial since the subject
matter of the reports had previously been brought out by both sides. Thus,
although the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion, Judge
Tone disagreed with its analysis of rules 106 and 801(d)(1)(B). In doing so,
50. 549 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1977).
51. See id. at 1114 for a discussion of the district court decision.
52. FED. R. EvID. 106.
53. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
54. See quoted material in note I I supra for reference to the substance of rule 402. See
549 F.2d at 1114 for a discussion of the court's reasoning on the issue of relevancy.
55. 549 F.2d at 1114.
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the court of appeals courteously softened the impact of its expressed disag-
reement with the district court's reasoning by stating that while not techni-
cally applicable, the rules dealt with analogous situations. 56 Incidentally,
district courts were admonished to admit such reports only when necessary
to remove confusion, false impressions, or other barriers to the ascertain-
ment of truth.
In United States v. Kopel,57 the defendant was convicted of wrongfully
using his position as a police officer to extort money from retail liquor
dealers and for knowingly making false material statements to a grand jury.
Over the defendant's objections of immateriality and irrelevancy, the district
court admitted portions of the defendant's grand jury testimony which
reflected the fact that he had consulted with his attorney prior to answering
the following question: "Other than crippled children, and boy scouts,
retirement parties, promotional events, have you ever received any money
from any taverns or any retail liquor distributors in the Seventh Police
District?" 58 [sic]
On appeal, the defendant asserted that by inviting the jury to speculate
on the reasons for his consultations with his attorney, the government had
improperly prejudiced and misled the jury. The court of appeals overruled
the defendant's objection holding that the statements were material to the
subject matter of the grand jury's investigation of the defendant for extortion
and were relevant to the perjury charge insofar as they tended to prove that
they were made wilfully and knowingly. Following the mandate of rule
403,59 the court of appeals then considered the defendant's assertion that the
admission of the transcript was unduly prejudicial. 6°
The defendant's argument that the evidence was reversibly prejudicial
turned on the assertion that it was error for the government to assure him that
he had a right to consult with counsel and then use the evidence of his
consultation against him. The defendant cited cases dealing with the defense
of entrapment and estoppel, urged that laymen would view a putative
defendant's use of counsel in a grand jury appearance as a "badge of guilt",
and asserted that the admission of the transcript would have a "chilling
effect" on his sixth amendment rights.61 The court of appeals found none of
these arguments meritorious. It specifically held that the neutral references
to the defendant's consultations with his attorney could not be characterized
as possessing a prejudicial impact which would substantially outweigh their
56. Id.
57. 552 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1977).
58. Id. at 1269.
59. See quoted material in note 31 supra.
60. 552 F.2d at 1268-72.
61. Id. at 1270-71.
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probative force as to the deliberateness of the false statements. 62
3. Rule 611(b): Scope of Cross-Examination
In United States v. Ellison,63 a pharmacist and a physician were
charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. To establish the
commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the government
offered telephone company records which disclosed that a private line had
been installed between the defendant physician and the pharmaceutical
company. On cross-examination of the telephone company official the
defendant offered records of several other telephone companies to establish
that the installation of such private lines was common practice in the area.
The government successfully objected on the basis that the records were
irrelevant. Noting that the district court had offered to allow the defendant to
put on other witnesses at a later time to establish the custom, the court of
appeals viewed the trial court's exclusion of the evidence as an exercise of
its discretion to control the order of proof by limiting the scope of the cross-
examination to the subject matter of the direct examination. 64 Thus, despite
an objection technically governed by rules 401, 402 and 403, the court of
appeals cited rule 611(b) which provides as follows: "Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness. The Court may in the exercise of
discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examina-
tion. ',65
In sum, neither court thought that the evidence was irrelevant as the
government contended, but rather, that it was merely misplaced. Thus,
although the government's objection to the evidence was sustained by both
courts, the differing bases for the objection and the rulings indicate a
discrepancy between the court of appeals and the district court as to which
rules were applicable.
4. Rules 701, 702 and 704: Opinions and Expert Testimony
The district court in United States v. Cyphers66 admitted testimony of a
government witness that established that the hairs recovered from articles
used by the robbers were "microscopically like" hair samples taken from
the defendants. The defendants objected on the grounds that the testimony
was so speculative as to be irrelevant and prejudicial and was not based on a
reasonable scientific certainty. The court of appeals held that the trial court
62. Id. at 1272.
63. 557 F.2d 128, 134-35 (7th Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 135.
65. FED. R. EVID. 611.
66. 553 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1977).
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had not erred in finding that the requirements of rule 70267 had been met in
that the witness was properly qualified as an expert and the subject matter of
his testimony was beyond the ken of the ordinary layman. Without further
discussion or disclosure of the witness' qualifications as an expert, Judge
Bauer merely stated: "Trial judges are given a broad discretion to determine
the qualifications of expert witnesses and to decide whether expert tes-
timony may assist the jury's deliberations. "68 Similar deferrence to the trial
court's discretion disposed of the defendants' objections to the relevancy
and the probative value of the evidence.
69
The court also rejected the defendants' contention that rule 702 requires
that an expert's opinion be expressed in terms of reasonably scientific
certainty. Judge Bauer stated: "We adhere to the rule that an expert's lack
of absolute certainty goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its admissi-
bility. ''70
In contrast to Cyphers' elucidation of the criteria for the admissibility
of expert testimony, the court of appeals in United States v. Harris
7'
considered the admissibility of opinion testimony of lay witnesses. In
Harris, the defendant was convicted of wilfully and by means of threats
endeavoring to influence, intimidate and impede a witness in the discharge
of her duty in another criminal case 72 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 7 3 To
sustain a conviction under this statute it was incumbent upon the govern-
ment to establish the defendant's specific intent to impede the witness. The
government produced three witnesses who testified to the defendant's ac-
tions for the purpose of circumstantially proving the requisite state of mind.
The final witness for the government was the trial judge in the other case,
who in response to defense counsel's questions concerning the defendant's
emotional appearance during the other courtroom incident, testified that
"there was a certain intensity about his appearance" and that "it left the
impression with me that he knew exactly what he was doing." 7 4 On appeal,
in addition to contending that the line of cross-examination questioning
evidenced defense counsel's inadequacy in violation of the accused's sixth
amendment right to effective counsel, the defendant also contended that the
67. Rule 702 states that: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
68. 553 F.2d at 1072.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1072-73.
71. 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977).
72. See United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970).
74. 558 F.2d at 370.
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response of the trial judge mandated reversal. 75
Although the opinion did not delineate the basis for the defendant's
objection, the court of appeals overruled the objection in a footnote76 on the
basis of rules 701 and 704. Rule 701 permits that:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or
the determination of a fact.
77
Rule 704 provides that: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
78
On the surface it appears that the testimony fulfilled the criteria of rule
761. However, Judge Sprecher expressed some doubt:
In the first place, we are not convinced that the testimony was
improper. The judge was simply stating his perceptions that de-
fendant's actions had a purposeful, not inadvertent, quality or
intensity to them . . . . However, even assuming the testimony
was improper, we believe there was sufficient other evidence
from which the jury could have inferred that defendant's actions
were intended to impede Ms. Hobbs in the discharge of her duties
as a witness.
79
5. Rule 801(d)(2)(E): Statements Made and Evidence
Offered by a Co-Conspirator
The offense charged in United States v. Papia ,80 elicited consideration
of rule 801(d)(2)(E)8 1 which excludes from the hearsay rule statements made
by a co-conspirator made during the course of and in furtherance of a
conspiracy when offered against a party. The challenged evidence in Papia
was a tape-recorded conversation between the government's witness, an
unindicted co-conspirator, and the defendants. The controversy arose due to
the fact that the tapes were made after the government's witness had been
arrested on unrelated state charges and had decided to cooperate in the
investigation of his co-conspirators. Thus, the crux of the defendants'
argument was that the statements were not made in the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 82
75. Id. at 371 n.5.
76. Id.
77. FED. R. EVID. 701.
78. FED. R. EVID. 704.
79. 558 F.2d at 371 n.5.
80. 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states that: "A statement is not hearsay if . . . [tlhe statement is
offered against a party and is . . . (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
82. In the alternative, the defendant argued that the tapes were prior consistent statements
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The court of appeals noted that the question of the admissibility of the
tapes had been extensively litigated in the district court, and that the trial
judge had conscientiously reviewed the contents of the tapes and determined
that six of the seven tapes contained statements made during the course of
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.83 Following a brief review of the
evidence, Judge Bauer affirmed the district court stating: "It is clear that a
co-conspirator's arrest does not in itself terminate a conspiracy as a matter of
law for the conspirators may remain fully capable of carrying out their
purpose, notwithstanding the arrest of one of their cohorts." 84
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Dorn ,85 further
elucidated Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 86 In this case, two "co-conspirators", who
were husband and wife, testified for the government. The wife testified as to
conversations with her husband in which he convinced her to join the
enterprise. The court of appeals sustained the admission of such testimony,
stating that: "[Tihe purpose of the Rule is 'to protect the accused against
idle chatter of criminal partners as well as inadvertently misreported and
deliberately fabricated evidence . . .' Conversations made by
conspirators to prospective co-conspirators for membership purposes are
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy .... "87
Although these government witnesses were referred to as "co-
conspirators" throughout the opinion, neither were defendants in the case.
Furthermore, the opinion did not indicate that they were unindicted co-
conspirators. However, the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
notes with regard to rule 801(d)(2)(E) that: "While the rule refers to a co-
conspirator, it is this committee's understanding that the rule is meant to
carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a joint venturer is
considered as a co-conspirator for the purposes of this rule even though no
conspiracy has been charged." 8
Insofar as the evidence in this case showed that the witness had
conducted many heroin transactions with the defendants, it is highly prob-
able that the court of appeals considered them joint venturers.8 9 Therefore,
within the meaning of rule 801(d)(l)(B) which had been prematurely admitted during direct-
examination to bolster the state's witness' credibility. The court of appeals summarily dismis-
sed this argument in a footnote finding that the tapes were not prior consistent statements, but
were the very statements to which the witness had testified. 560 F.2d at 844-45 n.9.
83. Id. at 835 for a discussion of the district court decision.
84. Id.
85. 561 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1977).
86. See quoted material in note 81 supra.
87. 561 F.2d at 1256-57.
88. See Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary accompanying FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E), 28 U.S.C.A. app. R. 801(d)(2) (t975). See also United States v. Spencer, 415 F.2d
1301 (7th Cir. 1969).
89. 561 F.2d at 1255.
EVIDENCE
Dorn stands for the proposition that statements relating to conspiratorial
activities may be admissible despite the fact that the person testifying to the
statements was neither a member of the conspiracy at the time of the illegal
act nor subsequently charged with the offense as long as there is some basis
for concluding that he was at a minimum a joint venturer in the activities.
6. Rule 609(a)(2): Impeachment by Prior Convictions
In United States v. Papia,9° the district court was asked to answer the
thorny and controversial question of whether a conviction for theft is
encompassed by rule 609(a)(2) 91 which permits the use of prior misde-
meanor convictions for impeachment purposes if the prior crime involved
"dishonesty or false statement." The district court admitted the evidence on
the basis of the government's uncontested assertion that the defendant's
theft conviction rested on facts revealing fraud and deceit. 92
Affirming the district court both in theory and in practice, the court of
appeals adopted the holding that even though the offense does not require
proof of fraud or deceit as an essential element of crime it may nevertheless
be admitted if the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of showing
that the conviction "rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false
statement description.' 93 In addition to noting that the government had
sustained its burden of proof by default, the court of appeals noted that the
original charge was for forgery and that the defendant had previously been
indicted for having made false statements in obtaining a bank loan.
It is suggested that the court's conclusion that "under the circum-
stances" the prior theft conviction had been properly admitted implies that
the issue will be decided on an ad hoc basis in the future. However, thus far
the trial and appellate courts agree on the factors to be considered.94
7. Rule 501: General Rule on Privileges
Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Parsons95 involved a mandamus action96
arising out of a grand jury investigation of a corporation, its officers,
90. 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
91. Rule 609 states that: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he had been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime . . .(2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." FED. R. EVID. 609. See 560 F.2d
at 847 for a discussion of the district court decision.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 364 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
94. The significant fact was that the prior conviction rested on facts revealing fraud and
deceit. See 560 F.2d at 847-48.
95. 561 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1977).
96. FED. R. App. P. 21.
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employees and attorneys to determine whether they had withheld certain
information from the United States Environmental Protection Agency .97 The
people involved in the defendant's assertion of attorney-client privilege
during the course of the investigation were one Neil Mitchell, general
counsel of Velsicol Chemical Corporation, and three attorneys of the outside
law firm of Sellers, Cooner & Cuneo who were involved in the representa-
tion of Velsicol before the Environmental Protection Agency. 98 Despite the
fact that the corporation asserted that it would exercise the attorney-client
privilege with respect to any communication between it and its outside
counsel, Mitchell testified voluntarily before the grand jury disclosing
conversations he had had with the attorneys of the Sellers firm. Subsequent-
ly, the grand jury subpoenaed the three outside attorneys to give testimony
and to produce documents relating to their representation of Velsicol.
Velsicol's motion to intervene in the grand jury proceeding was granted.
However, its motions to quash the subpoenaes and for a protective order
were denied. The district court granted the government's motion to compel
the testimony of the outside attorneys based on the finding that Mitchell's
testimony was "a general waiver" relating "primarily to the subject mat-
ter" rather than to specific conversations.
99
On appeal, Velsicol argued that Mitchell did not have the authority to
waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege, that Mitchell's disclosures
did not constitute a waiver insofar as they were inadvertent, and, finally,
that Mitchell's disclosures were involuntary because they were compelled
by a subpoena. In rejecting all of these claims' °° and affirming the district
court's ruling, the court of appeals stated:
Mitchell was in consultation with outside counsel during the
course of his testimony. His situation is hardly controlled by Rule
512 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as suggested by the appel-
lant. Mitchell was well aware of attorney-client privilege and
certainly not 'without opportunity to claim the privilege'. Neither
was he compelled to waive the privilege. Unlike Ackerly's post-
97. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (1970).
98. The defendant also asserted that the subpoena of a legal memorandum which had been
prepared in part by Mitchell with the assistance of counsel from the Seller's firm approximately
two years prior to the initiation of the investigation violated the work-product privilege. In
rejecting this contention, the court of appeals found that "the documents . . . were not
prepared in anticipation of a potential criminal litigation", and that "the focus of the inquiry [is]
to determine if their preparation was attended by misconduct," concluding that "under these
circumstances, . . . the Government [has] shown adequate grounds to acquire the docu-
ments." 561 F.2d at 676.
99. Id. at 674.
100. As to the first claim the court stated:
While Mitchell's presence before the grand jury may be characterized as a client for
purposes of determining attorney-client issues, vis-a-vis communications with outside
counsel, he was nonetheless possessed of the office of house couqsel of the corpora-




ure, Mitchell was not under court order to testify about privileged
communications. 101
Proposed Federal Rule 512 provided that: "Evidence of a statement or
other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of
the privilege if the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made
without opportunity to claim the privilege." 102 This proposed rule was not
enacted by Congress but was substituted by Rule 501. Rule 501 leaves the
entire matter of privileges to the general principles of common law in
criminal cases and to state law in civil cases in which such law supplies the
rule of decision with respect to a claim or defense. 103 Therefore, in Velsicol,
the court's ruling presumably was not based on rule 512, but rather on
"federally developed common-law based on modern reason and experi-
ence. ' 1
04
8. Rule 103: Rulings on Evidence
The controversy in United States v. Castenada10 5 which directed the
court's attention to rule 103 focused on the admissibility of the govern-
ment's medical expert's testimony in light of section 4244 of the Mental
Defectives Act."° In Castenada, the defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. During the trial, the defendant testified on direct examination
that he did not remember stabbing the victim. In rebuttal, the government
called one of the original examining psychiatrists who testified that the
defendant had described the incident, that the description was in "sufficient
detail" and that the defendant had "actually acted it out '. 107
On appeal, the defendant contended that his statements to the psychia-
101. Id.
102. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 512 (deleted and superseded).
103. FED. R. EvID. 501. Rule 501 sets the general rule on privilege in the following way:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
104. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1974] 4 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7058; H.R. REP No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in [1974] 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7082. See also United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976) (where
witness testified before grand jury allegedly without being informed of the privilege, his
testimcny was held voluntary and, thus, a waiver of the Speech or Debate clause privilege
despite the fact that he had been subpoenaed to testify. The court noted that the witness
testified rather than claiming his privilege against self-incrimination, and, therefore, his tes-
timony had not been erroneously compelled).
105. 555 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1977).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
107. 555 F.2d at 607.
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trist were improperly used against him in violation of section 4244 which
provides in pertinent part that: "No statement made by the accused in the
course of any examination into his sanity or mental competency provided for
by this action . . shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the
issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding .08 The court of appeals
rejected this contention noting that:
Section 4244 provides that statements of the accused are inadmiss-
ible only 'on the issue of guilt'. In this case, the defendant opened
the door on direct examination to the content of statements made
during his examination. The testimony of Dr. Brooks was elicited
in order to attack Castenada's credibility and as such was proper
impeachment. The testimony of Dr. Brooks was approved by the
Government on the limited issue of credibility rather than on the
issue of guilt and thus did not violate the statute.109
The court's failure to find error in admitting this evidence was buttress-
ed by the absence of any objections to the expert's testimony in the record.
In a footnote, the court noted that rule 103(a)" places an affirmative duty
on the party assigning errors to the admission of evidence to make a timely
objection or motion to strike. Although recognizing the possible applicabili-
ty of rule 103(d)1 l which allows judicial notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights despite the absence of an objection, the court also recog-
nized that its finding that the statute had not been violated precluded the
conclusion that there had been any error at all, let alone "plain error". 2
II
IMPLICIT RELIANCE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
In some instances, the evidentiary questions posed to the Seventh
Circuit were resolved by precedent which had formed the basis of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In these circumstances, the court of appeals
apparently was of the opinion that reference to and citation of the Federal
108. Id. at 608.
109. Id. at 609.
110, Rule 103 states that:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the
context; or ....
FED. R. EvID. 103.
111. Rule 103(d) on rulings regarding plain error states that: "Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
112. 555 F.2d at 610 n.I. The defendant further contended that the prosecution had
improperly dealt with his past criminal record impliedly invoking a violation of Federal Rule
404(b). The court again noted that there had been no objections or motions to strike made, and
refused to find that the defendant had been so unfairly prejudiced as to raise the doctrine of
plain error. Id. at 610-11.
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Rules would be redundant and of minimal value. This section will be
devoted to an analysis of those decisions and those Federal Rules that this
author feels implicitly support the resolution of the evidentiary issues.
A. Rule 1101 and Its Effect on Federal Rules 801 and 802.
In United States v. Yates" 1 3 and United States v. Harris. "4 the court of
appeals considered the propriety of the trial judge relying on hearsay
allegations and evidence in imposing a sentence. In the Yates sentencing
hearing, a government witness was allowed to testify that the defendant,
convicted of possessing and distributing cocaine, had been reported to have
sold marijuana and drugs while released on bond." 5 This testimony was
based on information supplied to the witness by others. The defendant
argued that the pre-sentence report prepared by the probation officer was the
proper primary source of information and that he, the defendant, should
have been afforded an opportunity to rebut claimed inaccuracies in the
statements from which testimony had been given at the sentencing hearing.
In affirming the sentence imposed by the district court, the court of
appeals relied on the following two conditions" 16 which had been met which
supported the district court's admission of the hearsay testimony. First, the
defendant had been given an opportunity to deny the accuracy of the hearsay
statements. Second, in imposing sentence, the trial judge had expressly
disclaimed reliance on the hearsay statements.
These same limitations on the admissibility of hearsay in sentencing
hearings were the focal point of the court of appeals' decision in United
States v. Harris. 17 In Harris, the court of appeals premised its discussion
of these two limitations by holding that "reliance upon hearsay in assessing
punishment is not per se improper."" 8 However, the court also noted that
"the Supreme Court [had] never suggested that a consideration of hearsay
[was] always proper.""1
9
In the court of appeals' analysis, its function was to strike a balance
between precluding reliance on erroneous hearsay and providing the trial
court with the discretion to admit the requisite amount of evidence to ensure
an informed sentencing decision. 120 As in Yates, the court noted that where
the sentencing judge relies on the hearsay information (the accuracy of
113. 554 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1977).
114. 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977).
115. 554 F.2d at 343.
116. Id. at 343-44.
117. 558 F.2d at 366.
118. Id. at 372.
119. Id. at 373.
120. Id. at 374.
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which is contested), the defendant must be given at least some opportunity
to rebut that information. However, the court rejected the rule that allowed
rebuttal only in instances in which the trial judge expressly relied on the
hearsay information.
In its stead, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit rule 2' that
the defendant should be given an opportunity to rebut the hearsay informa-
tion if "it was not improbable [that] the trial judge was influenced by
improper facts in imposing sentence." '122 The court concluded that such
influence was not improbable in light of its findings that the defense counsel
most likely had failed to examine the presentencing report, that there was a
discrepancy between the evaluation made in the presentence report and the
evaluation made in the objectionable hearsay report, and that the hearsay
report lacked any indicia of truthworthiness. Thus, the court of appeals
vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing to afford the defendant
an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the statements in the hearsay
report.
The Harris court's statement that "reliance on hearsay in assessing
punishment is not per se improper" reflects the application of rules 1101,123
801,124 and 802.125 Hearsay is defined in rule 801 as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and is
generally excluded by rule 802.126 However, rule 1101 provides that the
Federal Rules are inapplicable in "proceedings for extradition or rendition;
preliminary examinations in criminal cases; sentencing (emphasis added),
or granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal
summons, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on
bail or otherwise.'"
127
Thus, by virtue of these rules, hearsay statements are admissible in
sentencing hearings. However, these late Seventh Circuit decisions condi-
121. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972).
122. 558 F.2d at 375 (quoting McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d at 247).
123. Rule 1101(d) states that:
The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following situa-
tions: . . . Proceedings for extradition or rendition; preliminary examinations in
criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for
arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to
release or bail or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 1101(d).
124. Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. Evil. 801(c).
125. Rule 802 states that: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress." FED. R. EVID. 802.
126. See quoted material in note 124 supra.
127. See quoted material in note 123 supra.
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tion the admissibility of such hearsay evidence. Consequently, although
inherently premised on the proposition that the Federal Rules do not prohibit
hearsay in sentencing hearings, the Yates and Harris opinions adopted a
more restrictive rule on the admissibility of hearsay evidence in sentencing
hearings.
B. Rule 201: Judicial Notice
Rule 201 "governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts" and
provides that "a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.' 1 28 This rule
implicitly formed the basis for the evidentiary ruling in Newcomb v.
Brennan.'
29
In Newcomb, the plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights had
been violated when he was dismissed from his position as a deputy city
attorney by the city attorney who opposed the plaintiff's candidacy for
Congress. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. 13° Although noting that the dismissal of public
employees for reasons of political patronage had been held violative of the
first amendment, 31 the district court also noted that this general rule had
been held inapplicable to public employees occupying policy-making posi-
tions. 132 The district court's conclusion that the plaintiff occupied a policy-
making position turned on its observation that the deputy city attorney was
exempted from civil service, had no term of office, and had broad duties and
powers.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the district court erred in taking
judicial notice of the Wisconsin statute that defined his civil service
status, 133 of the City Charter that defined his term of office,' 34 and of the
Milwaukee Code of Ordinances that defined his duties and powers. 135 The
court of appeals rejected this contention by stating:
128. Rule 201(a) and (b) state that:
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. (b)
Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either, (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
FED. R. EviD. 201(a), 201(b).
129. 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1977).
130. Id. at 827.
131. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
132. See id. at 367 for a discussion of the district court opinion.
133. WIs. STAT. § 863.29(i) (1959).
134. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 83.03.
135. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 82-200.2(2).
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A court may take judicial notice of facts of "common knowledge"
in ruling on motions to dismiss. Robinson v. Mammoth Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 698, 699, (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 872 (1972). We hold that matters.of public
record such as state statutes, city charters and city ordinances fall
within the category of "common knowledge" and are therefore
proper subjects for judicial notice.
36
The court of appeals' reference to matters of "common knowledge" is
in line with the language of rule 201(b)(1) that the facts must be "generally
known". 137 Furthermore, the source of the facts judicially noticed also
fulfilled the criteria of rule 201(b) 138 insofar as those facts were capable of
accurate and ready determination by reference to highly accurate public
records. Thus, the court's opinion complied with rule 201 despite its lack of
reference to it.
C. Rule 901: Requirement of Authentication or Identification
Rule 901(a) states the general principle that: "the requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims." 3 9 This general principle is applied
largely by reference to common-law and statutory experience which corre-
sponds in part to the examples set forth in rule 901(b). Thus, the court of
appeals has considered the admissibility of evidence which required authen-
tication without reference to rule 901.
In United States v. Chaney,"4° the defendant was charged with mali-
ciously attempting to destroy a business affecting interstate commerce.
141
During the trial the government offered evidence of two threatening phone
calls made to the business the day of the bombing in which the caller
predicted the portion of the building which was later bombed. They were
offered in evidence on the theory that the defendant had made them. The
defendant objected to this evidence on the grounds that, under Brady v.
Maryland, 4 2 the government should have disclosed this evidence to him
prior to trial insofar as such evidence was exculpatory. Finding that the
evidence was inculpatory and, therefore, not the subject of compelled
disclosure, the court of appeals nevertheless noted that when these calls
were admitted over the defendant's objection, it was not too late for the
defendant to attempt to show a dissimilarity between his voice and the voice
136. 558 F.2d at 829.
137. See quoted material in note 128 supra.
138. Id.
139. FED. R. EvID. 901 (a).
140. 559 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1977).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1970).
142. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
EVIDENCE
of the caller. Thus, the court implied that rule 901(b)(4) and 901(b)(5)
would have been the better alternative on which to base an objection to the
admission of the telephone calls.
143
Rule 901(b)(4) permits authentication of telephone conversations by
"appearances, contents, substance, internal pattern, or other distinctive
characteristics taken in conjunction with the circumstances." 14 More spe-
cifically, rule 901(b)(5) provides that "identification of a voice; whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or
recording may be authenticated by opinion based upon hearing the voice at
any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker." 145 In
the absence of any argument as to the sufficiency of the foundation for these
telephone conversations, the court in Chaney found it unnecessary to give
content to the aforementioned rules in this case.
146
In contrast, the defendant in United States v. Kidding,147 asserted that
a photograph of him was admitted into evidence without proper foundation.
However, the court of appeals rejected this contention presumably relying
partially on both rule 901(b)(9) and rule 201. Rule 901(b)(9) suggests by
way of illustration that "evidence describing a process or system used to
produce a result showing that the process or system produces an accurate
result" is sufficient to authenticate a photograph.' The evidence found
sufficient in Kidding to support the admissibility of the photograph was a
witness' in-court identification of the defendant as the man who had asserted
that he was the "owner" of the stolen vehicle corroborated by the witness'
identification of the photograph of the defendant as that which he had earlier
identified as that of the "owner" of the vehicle. Thus, the court's focus was
on the latter part of rule 901(b)(9), i.e. testimony going to the accuracy of
the result. For this reason, the court omitted reference to the requirement
that evidence describing the photographic process should be admitted in
conjunction therewith. The court of appeals stated that, with this evidence,
the court could consider the photograph and make its own observation
whether or not it resembled the defendant. 14 9 Thus, the court implied that
the court could take judicial notice of the accuracy of the photograph in
143. 559 F.2d at 1097.
144. Rule 901(b)(4) states: "By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of
this rule . . . (4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circum-
stances." FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
145. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).
146. 559 F.2d at 1097.
147. 560 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 217 (1977).
148. Under Rule 901(b)(9), a process or system may be authenticated by: "Evidence
describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system
produces an accurate result." FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
149. 560 F.2d at 1312.
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accordance with rule 201,11° and the comments to rule 901(b).
D. Rule 614: Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by the Court
The decision in United States v. Kidding,' 51 also gave content to rule
614(b) which states that "a court may interrogate witnesses, whether called
by itself or by a party.' 1 52 This authority to question witnesses is a well-
established common law principle subject only to the limitation that the trial
judge should not assume the role of an advocate.' Insofar as the committee
comments to rule 614(b) acknowledge the inability to formulate a rule
delineating the manner in which interrogation should be conducted and the
proper extent of its exercise,' 54 such issues necessarily are resolved on an ad
hoc basis.
In Kidding, defendant Kidding had been asked nineteen questions
covering four pages of transcript while defendant Brown had been asked
thirty-seven questions covering eight pages of transcript. In affirming de-
fendant Brown's conviction, the court of appeals initially noted that "in a
non-jury case questioning by the trial judge will rarely be prejudicial.' 155
However, the court continued to analyze the non-jury case cited by the
defendant in which a conviction was reversed concluding that the reversal
was not predicated on the extent of the questioning but rather on evidence
showing that the trial judge had already decided the case adversely to the
defendant prior to hearing all the evidence. 156 In applying this case in
Kidding, the court of appeals noted an additional factor to be considered in
assessing the effect of a trial judge's questioning: the attitude of the judge
towards the case at the time of questioning. 57 Therefore, Kidding stands for
the simple proposition that the court of appeals will sustain questioning of
witnesses by the lower court as long as the trial judge remains impartial.
E. Rule 501: Privileges
Unlike the decision in Velsicol Chemical Corporation v. Parsons15 8 in
which the Seventh Circuit cited superceded Federal Rule 512,159 in United
States v. Tucker' 60 the court cited neither a proposed nor an adopted federal
150. See material quoted in note 128 supra.
151. 560 F.2d at 1303.
152. Rule 614(b) states that: "The Court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself
or by a party." FED. R. EVID. 614(b).
153. See id. and accompanying Advisory Committee's Note, 28 U.S.C.A. app. R. 614(b).
154. Id.
155. 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977).
156. United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970).
157. 560 F.2d at 1314.
158. 561 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc). See text accompanying note 95 supra.
159. Id. at 675.
160. 552 F.2d 202, 210 (7th Cir. 1977).
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rule to support its finding that the district court had erred in failing to require
that the government either disclose the identity of an informer or dismiss the
prosecution. As noted previously, this issue may be resolved by reference to
rule 501 which in criminal cases generally demands reference to the
common law of privileges. 
161
In Tucker, the defendant was indicted for distributing heroin. The
transaction allegedly occurred in the presence of two government informers.
Insofar as the defendant denied all involvement in the sale, his testimony
directly conflicted with that of one of the agent-informers. Although the
government conceded that the conviction could not have been obtained
without the testimony of this informant, the government refused to disclose
the identity or whereabouts of the second informant whose testimony was
the only means by which the factual controversy presented by the other
testimony could be resolved. The district court refused to compel disclosure,
but stated that:
If you have one-on-one contradictory testimony, and the govern-
ment has a second witness who could clarify it, and they do not
call that witness, I am thus obligated to assume, as I would tell a
jury, that they must draw the conclusion that that witness if called
would testify favorably to the defendant.
62
The district court further noted that this inference as to what a missing
witness would testify would add only some evidence to the defendant's
testimony. Obviously, it did not add enough since the trial court subsequent-
ly convicted the defendant.
163
On appeal, the defendant relied on Roviaro v. United States164 in
which it was stated that: "where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or
the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of
the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege
must give way." 165 The court of appeals rejected the government's attempt
to distinguish Roviaro and upon "balancing the public interest in protecting
the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his de-
fense. " " In doing so, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court's
refusal to compel disclosure had denied the defendant a fair trial. However,
the court did not feel that this conclusion in and of itself mandated a
judgment of acquittal.
The court proceeded to consider the defendant's second argument
based on the district court's ruling on the evidentiary missing witness
161. See text within note 103 supra.
162. 552 F.2d at 207.
163. See id. at 204 for a discussion of the district court decision.
164. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
165. Id. at 60-61.
166. 552 F.2d at 208 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 62 (1957)).
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inference. Affirming the district court's ruling on this issue, the court of
appeals noted that the rule authorizes only a permissive inference rather than
a presumption that the testimony if produced would be unfavorable. Further-
more, Judge Pell stated that: "The rule of the inference may . . .be a
limited one; it has been stated, e.g., that the missing witness inference may
diminish the strength of the non-calling party's evidence and strengthen the
opponent's evidence but does not have the force of independent direct
evidence. " 
16 7
In sum, the court of appeals held that the denial of the defendant's
motion for a judgment of acquittal at the trial level did not constitute fatal
error. The defendant's opportunities, however, were not completely exting-
uished. Judge Pell and his colleagues reversed and remanded for a new trial
in which the identity of the informer would be disclosed.
168
F. Rule 404: Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove
Conduct, Exceptions, Other Crimes
Generally, rule 404 excludes evidence of a person's character and of
other crimes, acts or wrongs when offered for the purpose of proving that he
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. 169 However, this rule
is subject to several exceptions, two of which presumably formed the basis
of the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Loman, 17 ° and United
States v. Grabiec. 171
In Loman, one of the defendants was charged with assault with a
dangerous weapon of a postal carrier while performing her official duties.
At trial, one defendant testified that she had assaulted the postal carrier in
self-defense. To establish this defense, the defendant offered the postal
carrier's file which included some complaints against her as a mail carrier.
Concluding that it was irrelevant, the district court refused this offer of proof
either for impeachment purposes or for proof of a violent character of the
victim. 17 2 The court of appeals affirmed without discussion.
Without regard to relevancy, this evidence seems to fulfill the criteria
of the second exception to rule 404(a) which admits evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime when offered by an accused. 1
73
167. 552 F.2d at 210 (citing Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
168. 552 F.2d at 211.
169. See quoted material in note 7 supra.
170. 551 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2982 (1977).
171. 563 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1977).
172. See 551 F.2d at 166 for a discussion of the district court opinion.
173. Rule 404(a)(2) states that:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except. . . .(2) Character of victim. Evidence of pertinent trait of character of the
EVIDENCE
The rule itself does not indicate the type of crime which permits the
circumstantial use of character evidence of the victim of the crime. How-
ever, the advisory committee's notes accompanying rule 404(a) suggest that
such evidence is limited to use in support of a claim of self-defense to a
charge of homicide or consent in a case of rape. 174 Therefore, although
Loman was a criminal case, the court may well have adopted the narrow
interpretation of the rule suggested by the committee's notes. Furthermore,
the court may have found that the information in the file pertained only to
general character traits rather than specific traits pertinent to a claim of self-
defense. In light of the court's cursory review of this evidentiary issue, the
basis of the court's affirmance remains unclear.
Similarly, the court of appeals' decision in United States v. Grabiec1
75
affirmed the admission of evidence of other crimes as governed by rule
404(b). In Grabiec, the defendant was convicted of a conspiracy to extort
money for "fixing" a licensing violation.176 During the course of the trial,
the government offered testimony concerning four extortive license applica-
tion transactions conducted by a co-defendant. The defendant argued that
the admission of this testimony constituted reversible error on the ground
that these offenses were wholly independent of the offense charged.
Rule 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove that character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or acci-
dent. 1 7
Without citing this rule, the court of appeals referred to an earlier Seventh
Circuit case in which it was held that "evidence of other criminal activity is
clearly admissible if it is relevant to indicate motive or some other element
of the crime charged unless minor probative value is outweighed by major
prejudicial effect."1 78 Although this statement is broad enough to encom-
pass the admissible purposes of rule 404(b), i.e. motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait or peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;...
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). The district court correctly concluded that this character evidence of
specific instances of conduct was not admissible for impeachment purposes for rule 608 limits
such character evidence to the trait of truthfulness or untruthfulness. FED. R. EVID. 608.
174. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) and accompanying Advisory Committee's Note, 28
U.S.C.A. app. R. 404(a)(2) (1975).
175. 563 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1977).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
177. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
178. U.S. v. Pate, 426 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added).
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accident, the court of appeals ultimately concluded that the four transactions
"illuminated the character of the conspiracy and the extent of the involve-
ment of the parties. The role played by Moran and his modus operandi were
unquestionably probative matters. "
179
Although this purpose does not explicitly fall within those enumerated
in rule 404(b), the court's emphasis on the limiting instruction that the
evidence cotld not be considered with respect to the objecting defendant
may justify its conclusion that he was not so unduly prejudiced as to result in
the denial of a fair trial.
However, the majority opinion was severely criticized by Judge Swy-
gert. 180 He suggested that the dissimilarity between the prior transactions
and the crime charged precluded the possibility that the former could denote
intent, preparation, plan, etc. of the latter, that two of the transactions had
occurred after the conspiracy had ended, and finally, that the admonishment
of the jury was, probably, totally ineffective. In light of the fact that
character evidence, as presented in the context of other crimes, acts or
wrongs, may be of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial, this
author tends to agree with Judge Swygert that the majority disregarded the
exclusionary portion of rule 404(b) and the irrelevancy of the evidence of
the prior transactions with respect to the objecting defendant. Hopefully,
this was only a momentary lapse on the part of the majority of the court.
G. Rule 608: Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
In United States v. Bursten ,181 the prosecution attempted to introduce
into evidence the plea agreement between a government witness and the
government which contained a sentence indicating the witness' readiness to
submit to a polygraph examination in regard to the matter embodied in the
agreement including disclosures corroborative of his testimony at trial.
Although the district court initially excised the objectionable sentence, it
reversed its ruling during the cross-examination of the witness and allowed
the jurors to view the entire agreement. On cross-examination the defendant
did not emphasize the fact that the witness had not in fact taken a polygraph
test but urged reversal on appeal.
18 2
After suggesting that the admissibility of the results of a polygraph
examination is a matter within the discretion of the trial court,183 the court of
appeals held that the district court had erred in admitting this statement
179. United States v. Grabeic, 563 F.2d at 318. Moran was a central figure in the conspiracy
at issue as well as in the prior transactions of the co-defendant.
180. Id. at 319-21.
181. 560 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1977).
182. Id. at 785.
183. Id. See United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974).
EVIDENCE
because it had been offered by the prosecution on direct to support the
credibility of the witness. In a per curiam opinion, the court stated: "Given
the awesome powers which the prosecution may wield in order to ensure the
veracity of its witnesses' statements, we strongly condemn this superfluous
practice. Prosecutors who introduce such evidence in the future to obtain
convictions should expect reversal.""8 4
However, the court further noted that the trial court had protected
against the possibility that the sentence would affect the jury's assessment of
the witness' credibility by refusing to permit it to be read aloud and
curtailing all discussion of it in the presence of the jury. In light of these
circumstances and the protracted cross-examination of the witness, the court
concluded that the jury's perusal of one sentence would not constitute
reversible error.
The court's statement that the government's offer of proof was a
"superfluous practice", in light of its finding that the evidence was offered
to support the credibility of the witness, implies judicial recognition of rule
608(a). This rule provides that:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (I) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attack-
ed by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.' 85
Clearly, the statement referring to the witness' willingness to take a polyg-
raph test on his disclosures is evidence attempting to show a truthful
character. However, these statements were offered on direct examination of
the witness, prior to any opportunity for the defense to attack the credibility
of the witness. Therefore, the court's conclusion that the admission of such
evidence should demand reversal in the future complies with rule 608.
III
MISCELLANEOUS EVIDENTIARY QUESTIONS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has re-
viewed in the past year several cases in which the evidentiary questions have
not been governed either explicitly or implicitly by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. A review of these cases follows.
In United States v. Crowell,186 the defendant was found guilty of four
firearm violations.187 To sustain this charge, the government was required to
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
186. 559 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1977).
187. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5849 (1968).
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prove that the shotgun in question had a barrel length of less than eighteen
inches. The shotgun was admitted into evidence and taken to the jury room
during its deliberation. However, prior to its admission, the government
failed to elicit testimony as to the measured length. Futhermore, the defend-
ant did not attempt to show that the barrel was greater than eighteen inches
in length. The only testimony with regard to length of the gun came at the
close of all evidence when the prosecution said the gun was about fourteen
inches in length, and the district court judge replied that the jury could
determine the matter.
188
In a per curiam opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the use of real
evidence in lieu of and without the support of testimonial evidence stating:
"While the better practice would have been to prove the barrel's length by
measurement testimony, the shotgun was in the juror's presence during their
deliberations, and they could observe that its barrel length was about 14
inches and under 18 inches, as required."-
189
The court of appeals' simplistic resolution of this issue underscores the
viability of the absolute right to an appeal. Although this right to an appeal
places an affirmative duty on lawyers to prepare briefs and present oral
arguments regardless of the weaknesses of their clients' challenges, there is
no correlative duty on the reviewing courts to expend judicial time and
energy in writing opinions to simply affirm a lower court's decision. Thus,
it is suggested that this appeal could and should have been disposed of
summarily in a per curiam opinion that simply stated "Affirmed."
In a second per curiam opinion, the court of appeals in United States v.
Spears'90 reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial
judge had improperly commented during defense counsel's closing argu-
ment thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial. Following a review of
the colloquy between the defense attorney and the trial judge conducted in
the presence of the jury, the court of appeals concluded:
On balance, we think that the trial judge "lost his cool", departed
from the equanimity of spirit required of him, and seriously preju-
diced the defense. . .In the instant case, the defense counsel had
engaged in conduct for which he deserved reprimand and censure.
However, any such reprimand or censure should have been made
outside the presence of the jury. 91
Again, although rule 614 permits the court to call and interrogate
witnesses on its own motion, 1" the Federal Rules are silent on the issue of
whether the court may comment during closing argument. However, Spears
188. See 559 F.2d at 1085 for a discussion of the district court decision.
189. Id.
190. 558 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1977).
191. Id. at 1298.
192. Rule 614 in pertinent part states that:
EVIDENCE
stands for the proposition that the court may not reprimand counsel during
closing argument if such comment is so castigating as to discredit counsel in
the eyes of the jury.
As in United States v. Kopel, 193 the appeal in United States v. How-
ard94 required consideration of the materiality of the defendant's grand jury
testimony which formed the basis for his conviction for perjury. 195 The
defendant-witness was an attorney who was asked whether he had met with
his client, John Lind, on a particular date. Lind was the subject of the grand
jury's investigation. The government contended that the question pertaining
to the encounter between the defendant and Lind was material because the
encounter was more one of co-conspirators than one between a lawyer and
client.
Prior to his appearance the defendant had made a motion to quash the
subpoena raising issues relating to the attorney-client privilege. Noting the
trial court's ruling that no questions pertaining to the defendant's relation-
ship with Lind were to be propounded to the defendant until the scope of the
attorney-cleint privilege could be ascertained, 196 the court of appeals re-
jected the government's contention that the questioning immediately follow-
ing the hearing was proper.
Judge Sprecher stated that:
This Circuit had adopted the classic formulation of materiality;
false testimony if it 'has the natural effect or tendency to impede,
influence or disuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation
. .. . 'Merely potential interference with a line of inquiry is
sufficient to establish materiality regardless of whether the per-
jured testimony actually serves to impede the investigation.'97
However, Judge Sprecher limited this broad definition noting that it is the
court's function to "ascertain whether the responses of a witness charged as
knowingly false relate to a matter of inquiry properly within the ambit of the
grand jury's investigative powers." 19
8
The court conceded that normally questions pertaining to a witness'
conversation and meetings with a person who is the subject of the investiga-
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party,
call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called. (b)
Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself
or by a party. (c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to
interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when
the jury is not present.
FED. R. EVID. 614(a), (b), (c).
193. 552 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra.
194. 560 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1977).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970).
196. 560 F.2d at 282.
197. Id. at 284.
198. Id.
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tion are material. However, Judge Sprecher concluded that "the knowledge
that an attorney met with his client, without more, could not possibly assist
the grand jury in its investigation, or influence it in its pursuit'of facts." 199
Thus, given the relationship of the defendant to the person subject to the
investigation, and the limitation on the scope of the inquiry, the court of
appeals reversed the defendant's conviction.
In United States v. Diggs,2° the defendant's appeal also arose out of
his conviction for perjury before a grand jury. However, in this instance, the
defendant's sole contention was that the government's evidence was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the "two-witness" requirement for perjury convictions. As
in United States v. Howard,201 the defendant's testimony before the grand
jury related to an investigation of the criminal activities of John Lind.
During the grand jury proceedings, the defendant denied knowing that John
Lind owned a machine gun and his having taken Lind's machine gun to one
Halbert Vanover. During the trial, Vanover refuted the defendant's denials.
Three other witnesses corroborated Vanover's testimony. The defendant
contended that the government failed as a matter of law to provide sufficient
evidence of perjury insofar as they had failed to satisfy the rule that "the
uncorroborated oath of one witness is not enough to establish the falsity of
the testimony of the accused set forth in the indictment as perjury. -202
Judge Swygert rejected this contention holding that "the two witness
rule does not literally require the direct testimony of two separate witnesses,
but rather may be satisfied by the direct testimony of one witness and
sufficient corroborative evidence.' '203 Integral to this holding was the
court's assessment of the required sufficiency of the corroborative evidence.
Judge Swygert concluded that:
No wording of the rule requires the corrobative evidence to be
sufficient for conviction; nor does any phrasing permit conviction
where the corroboration consists of merely peripheral testimony
not tending to show the falsity of the accused's statements while
under oath. The two-witness rule is thus satisfied when there is
direct testimony from one witness and additional independent
evidence so corroborative of the direct testimony that the two
when considered together are sufficient to establish the falsity of
the accused's statements under oath beyond a reasonable doubt
... . This independent corrobating evidence must be truthwor-
thy enough to convince the jury that what the principal witness
said was correct, the ultimate determination of its credibility being
an exclusive function of the jury."
2
01
199. Id. at 285.
200. 560 F.2d 266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 404 (1977).
201. 560 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1977).
202. Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926).
203. United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d at 269.
204. Id. at 270.
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Finding the corroborative evidence reasonably sufficient to convince a jury,
the court of appeals held that the "two-witness" rule had been satisfied and
affirmed the defendant's conviction.
United States v. Paepke20 5 was a case of first impression in which the
court was asked to determine to what extent the exclusionary rule would
prohibit the use of illegally seized evidence to prove tax fraud allegedly
committed some months after the seizure. At the time of the defendant's
arrest in 1971, $12,725 was illegally seized from him. This money was
subsequently turned over to the Internal Revenue Service which assessed a
deficiency of approximately $26,000 for the taxable year 1971 and levied
upon the funds seized. In April of 1972, the defendant filed an individual tax
return for the year ending December 31, 1975, which listed an adjusted
gross income of $3,275, noted a total tax due of $234, and claimed a refund
of $12,491 (the money seized by the IRS).
The United States challenged this return alleging in its indictment that
the defendant knowingly, under penalty of perjury, understated his adjusted
gross income and misstated its source. Prior to trial, the district court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress all evidence relating to the illegal
search and seizure including documents concerning the defendant's efforts
to retrieve the money.206 The government appealed. The court of appeals
held that the district court had erred in suppressing this evidence.
The documentary evidence which had been suppressed consisted of a
tax court complaint filed by the defendant, the defendant's tax return for
1971, his refund claim filed with the IRS in 1974, and the complaint in a
civil suit for refund initiated by the defendant. The issue was whether the
defendant's own actions had sufficiently purged the evidence of the taint of
the illegal seizure. Noting that the defendant had had five months to
consider the consequences of failing to state the $12,275 as income, that he
had been assisted by counsel in this decision, and that the defendant had the
alternative of reporting the $12,725 and claiming the fifth amendment
against self-incrimination as to its source, the court of appeals concluded
that the taint had been sufficiently purged. Furthermore, the court concluded
that to hold otherwise would damage the proper functioning of the self-
reporting system by frustrating the enforcement process without achieving
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 207
As to the admissibility of the illegally seized evidence, the court of
appeals drew upon two cases 2 8 in which illegally seized evidence had been
205. 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977).
206. Id. at 388.
207. Id. at 390-91, 393.
208. Id. at 392 (cited in United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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admitted as affirmative proof of perjury committed before a grand jury.
Finding that the crime of tax fraud involves the making of false statements
similar to those giving rise to a charge of perjury before a grand jury, the
court of appeals quoted from the 1975 United States Supreme Court decision
Oregon v. Hass in which it was stated: "[T]he shield provided by Miranda
[v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], is not to be preverted to a license to
testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confronta-
tion with prior inconsistent utterances.'"209 Concluding that the evidence
concerning the fact of the defendant's possession of the money should also
have been admitted, the court of appeals thus adopted the Supreme Court's
philosophy that protective rules which would exclude otherwise competent
evidence should not be afforded a defendant when they permit a defendant
to subsequently hood-wink the courts.
210
The petitioner's conviction in United States ex rel. Moore v. Brier-
ton211 arose from the murder of a bartender by a patron of a Lansing, Illinois
bar. During the trial, a government witness had testified that two days after
the murder a man whom he knew as "Slick" had told him that he had shot a
Lansing bartender and that the petitioner Moore was the man whom he knew
as "Slick." The petitioner's appeal from the denial of his petition for
habeus corpus was based on his assertion that the prosecution had failed to
provide him with exculpatory materials at the time of the trial. Two of the
five items of allegedly exulpatory evidence withheld consisted of prior
statements and comments of the witness which tended to cast doubt on his
testimony at trial.212
The court of appeals noted that the district court had followed the test
set forth in United States v. Agars213 and determined that:
Since the petitioner had made no specific request at trial for the
statements of Virgil Sanders, the prosecutor's failure to turn over
the five items constituted a denial of due process only if, on a
consideration of the entire record, the omitted evidence created a
reasonable doubt of Moore's guilt.
214
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals found that such a violation
had occurred.
209. 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975). The Court also cited with approval Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1972) and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
210. See cases cited within note 209 supra.
211. 560 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1977).
212. Id. at 290.
213. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
214. 560 F.2d at 291.
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The court of appeals first found that the defendant's request for the
statements in the possession of the prosecution, the Lansing police chief, or
the Chicago superintendent of police taken from any witnesses subsequent
to the murder was not a specific request.2 15 Secondly, upon a review of the
record, the court of appeals noted that there had been two eyewitnesses to
the murder who had testified at trial that the defendant was the murderer.
2 16
And, finally, since the controversial government witness was not present
when the offense was committed, it would be unlikely that the witness
would be called at a new trial. Therefore, since the witness' credibility
would not then be in issue, a new trial in which the evidence would be
disclosed would add nothing.1 17 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's determination that the undisclosed items did not create a
reasonable doubt of the petitioner's guilt.
The appeal in Pearson v. Furnco Construction Company,218 arose from
the district court's dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for lack of stand-
ing. The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
The plaintiffs were eight black bricklayers. The defendant was a mason
contractor who had performed a number of jobs in the Chicago and northern
Indiana area. The controversy arose when the defendant obtained permis-
sion from the Secretary of Labor of the United States to hire Canadian
bricklayers for a job at Inland Steel. To obtain permission to allow these
employees to enter the United States as non-immigrants for temporary work,
the defendant had to represent to the Secretary that it had been unable to find
any qualified bricklayers in the United States. The plaintiffs' complaint
generally alleged that they were qualified and available and would have
accepted the employment if offered. Therefore, the crux of the plaintiffs'
complaint was that the defendant had deliberately avoided considering them
for employment. The district court had decided that the plaintiffs' lacked
standing because none of them had applied to the defendant for work on the
Inland job, and therefore had suffered no actual injury. 219
Although conceding that the plaintiffs had not applied for employment,
the court of appeals noted the plaintiffs had sought employment at numerous
other jobs performed by the defendant in the area and that they had previous-
ly instituted suits against the defendant based on the same claims of dis-
criminatory denial of employment. Chief Judge Fairchild concluded that:
these plaintiffs alleged a sufficient demonstration of interest in
employment which they brought to the attention of Furnco, so
215. Id. at 292.
216. Id. at 291.
217. Id. at 292.
218. 563 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1977).
219. Id. at 817.
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that it is fair and reasonable to treat plaintiffs as applicants for the
Inland job if they can show . . . that they were available and
would have applied if they had been made aware of the job. Such
proof would adequately demonstrate injury to plaintiffs and enti-
tle them . . . to the inference of discrimination . . . assuming
plaintiffs can prove their qualifications.220
Thus, the evidentiary question posed to the court of appeals in this
decision was the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' proof of actual injury to get
them into court. The court of appeals concluded that the district court had




Of the three hundred and forty-one published opinions rendered by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from October, 1976
to the date of this writing, only twenty-nine have posed evidentiary ques-
tions. Of these twenty-nine appeals, twenty-four were criminal cases, three
were section 1983 and 1981 civil rights actions, and one was a mandamus
proceeding. Fifteen different Federal Rules of Evidence were expressly
cited either as the basis for the objection or for the resolution of the issue in
fourteen opinions. Ten of these rules could have formed the basis of the
court of appeals' decision in nine opinions. In seven cases, the objections
and opinions were based on criminal statutory and case law, and common
law precedent having no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
222
The district court was reversed in only three of the fourteen opinions
expressly citing the Federal Rules. However, only one of these three
reversals was due to a clear conflict in the interpretation of the evidentiary
rule relied upon. In a second reversal, the court of appeals relied on a federal
rule which was probably not considered by the district court. In the third
reversal, the courts agreed on the exclusion of the evidence but disagreed as
to the extent of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence.
Of the eleven opinions citing a federal rule and affirming the district
court's evidentiary rulings, the court of appeals relied on an unadopted,
proposed rule in one instance, differed in the district court's choice of the
applicable federal rule in a second instance, and noted an additional rule
supporting the district court's conclusion in a third. Thus, of these fourteen
220. Id. at 818.
221. Id.
222. In Cyphers, Harris and Papia, the court of appeals ruled on two evidentiary issues in
each case. The Cyphers and Papia courts cited two Federal Rules in each. In Harris, one
Federal Rule was cited and the other implied by this author. Thus, although this article
discussed 29 cases, it is concerned with the resolution of 31 evidentiary issues.
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opinions referring expressly to the Federal Rules of Evidence, it may be
concluded that the trial and appellate courts were in clear agreement as to the
admissibility of the evidence under the Federal Rules in nine cases. These
nine cases involved the consideration of Federal Rules 404(b), 403, 611 (b),
702, 704, 801(d)(2)(E) and 609(a)(2). The one clear reversal arose from the
interpretation of rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.
In the cases in which this author discerned a federal rule basis for the
court of appeals' results, the court affirmed the district court in six cases and
reversed in two without citing the Federal Rules of Evidence. The affirm-
ances were of evidentiary rulings implicitly supported by rules 1101 and
803, 201, 801 and 404(a) and (b). The court of appeals presumably disag-
reed with the district court's analysis of rules 501 and 608(a) in the two
instances of reversal.
In sum, it may be concluded that the courts agreed on the resolution of
fifteen evidentiary issues either expressly or impliedly governed by the
Federal Rules. In only three instances was there complete disagreement; in
four instances, no conclusion may be drawn. Of the seven cases in which the
Federal Rules did not govern, the District Court was affirmed in three and
reversed in four.
Several trends may be gleaned from this compliation and analysis of
these cases. First, the paucity of appellate court cases dealing with eviden-
tiary questions governed either expressly or impliedly by the Federal Rules
of Evidence suggests a uniformity of opinion among lawyers and judges as
to the interpretation and application of these rules. Second, this uniformity
of opinion is also reflected in the incidence of affirmance on appeal. Third,
the great majority of cases appealed were criminal cases. This final
phenomena may be attributed to a disproportionate number of criminal to
civil cases being heard in the district courts in Wisconsin, Indiana and
Illinois due to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.223
In short, it seems as though the Federal Rules of Evidence have been
readily adopted and assimilated by all the federal courts in this Seventh
Circuit. It is hoped and expected that, as time goes on, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit will continue to construe the rules
in light of the purpose which Congress intended: "These rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." 
224
223. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174 (1974).
224. FED. R. EvID. 102, 28 U.S.C.A. app. (1975).
